In this paper we evaluate the effect of a large welfare program in rural Mexico. For such a purpose we use an evaluation sample that includes a number of villages where the program was not implemented for evaluation purposes. We estimate a structural model of education choices and argue that without such a framework it is impossible to evaluate the effect of the program and, especially, possible changes to its structure. We also argue that the randomized component of the data allows us to identify a more flexible model that is better suited to evaluate the program. We find that the program has a positive effect on the enrollment of children, especially after primary school. We also find that an approximately revenue neutral change in the program that would increase the grant for secondary school children while eliminating for the primary school children would have a substantially larger effect on enrollment of the latter, while having minor effects on the former. * This paper has benefitted from valuable comments from
Introduction
In 1998 the Mexican government started a remarkable new intervention in rural localities. Progresa is a program whose main aim is to improve the process of human capital accumulation in the poorest communities by providing cash transfers conditional on specific types of behaviour in three key areas targeted by the program: nutrition, health and education. Arguably the largest of the three components of the program was the education one. Mothers in the poorest households in a set of targeted villages are given grants to keep their children in school. The grants start in third grade and increase until the ninth and they are conditional on school enrolment and attendance. Progresa was noticeable and remarkable not only for the original design but also because, when the program begun, the Mexican government started a rigorous evaluation of its effects.
The evaluation of Progresa is greatly helped by the existence of a high quality data set whose collection was started at the outset of the program, between 1997 and 1998. The officials in charge of the program identified 506 communities that qualified for the program and started the collection of a rich longitudinal data set in these communities. Moreover, 186 of these communities where randomized out of the program with the purpose of providing a control group that would enhance the evaluation. However, rather than being excluded from the program all together, in the control villages the program was postponed for about two years, during which period, four waves of the panel were collected. Within each community in the evaluation sample, all households, both beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries, were covered by the survey. In the control villages, it is possible to identify the would-be beneficiaries were the program to be implemented.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of monetary incentives on education choices in rural Mexico and to address issues to do with the design of educational interventions aimed at improving educational participation. To achieve this goal we combine the information provided by the randomized allocation of Progresa across localities with a simple structural model of education choices. The contributions of the paper are therefore twofold: on the one hand, we estimate the effect of PROGRESA on school enrolment and predict the effect of slightly different programs; on the other, we see our approach to this particular evaluation problem as making a methodological contribution to the evaluation literature. We show that even when data from a randomized trial are available, the use of a structural model is necessary if one wants to improve the design of the program using the evaluation evidence.
By all accounts and evidence Progresa was a highly successful randomized experiment of a major welfare programme (see Schultz, 2003) . Hence the actual programme can be evaluated by comparing mean outcomes between treatment and control villages. However, to get more out of this exceptional experiment we need to provide a model of individual behavior, which we could estimate exploiting the rich data set and the experimental variation. PROGRESA effectively changes the relative price of education and child labour. A tighly parametrized model, therefore, could be used, together with data on wages and enrollment, to predict the effect of the program even before its implementation This is the strategy followed, for instance by Todd and Wolpin (2003) . Here we exploit the exogeous variation induced by the randomization to estimate a more flexible specification for our model. Critically, we do not restrict the effect of the grant to be the same as that of wages, although from an economic point of view they both represent an opportunity cost to schooling. The experiment allows us to test whether the grant and the wage have the same effect.
In what follows, we estimate a dynamic structural model of education choice using survey data colleccted to evaluate the experiment. Our model is similar to the Willis and Rosen (1979) model where individuals base their choice on comparing the costs and benefits of additional schooling depending on their comparative advantage. Our estimation approach is similar to that of a much simplified version of the model by Keane and Wolpin (1997) , although their problem is a more complete study of careers. A distinguishing feature of our model is the use of the randomised experiment and the fact that we can allow the programme effect to differ from the effect of the wage, which is the usual opportunity cost of education. This is potentially very important for understanding 3 the extent to which ex-ante evaluation can be helpful in predicting the effects of a planned intervention of this sort.
A study of this sort and a better understanding of the effectiveness of such a policy is important as deficits in the accumulation of human capital have been identified by several commentators as one of the main reasons for the relatively modest growth performance of Latin American economies in comparison, for instance, with some of the South East Asian countries (see, for instance, , Behrman, Duryea and Székely, 1999 ,2000 .
For this reason, the programme we study and similar ones have received considerable attention in Latin America.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the main features of the programme and of the evaluation survey we use. In section 3, we present some simple results on the effectiveness of the programme based on the comparison of treatment and control villages and discuss the limitations of this evidence. In section 4, we present a structural dynamic model of education choices that we estimate by Maximum Likelihood.
Section 5 presents the results we obtain from the estimation and uses the model to perform a number of policy simulations that could help to fine-tune the programme. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with some thoughts about open issues and future research.
2 The PROGRESA program.
In 1997, the Mexican government started a large program to reduce poverty in rural Mexico. The programme proposed by the Zedillo administration was innovative in that introduced a number of incentives and conditions with which participant households had to comply to keep receiving the programme's benefits. When the programme was started, the administration decided to collect a large longitudinal survey with the scope of evaluating the effectiveness of the program, In this section, we describe the main features of the programme and of the evaluation survey. 
The specifics of the PROGRESA program
PROGRESA is the Spanish acronym for 'Health, Nutrition and Education', that are the three main areas of the program. PROGRESA is one of the first and probably the best known of the so-called 'conditional cash transfers', which aim at alleviating poverty in the short run while at the same time fostering the accumulation of human capital to reduce it in the long run. This is achieved by transfering cash to poor households under the condition that they engage in behaviours that are consistent with the accumulation of human capital: the nutritional subsidy is paid to mothers that register the children for growth and development check ups and vaccinate them as well as attend courses on hygiene, nutrition and contracception. The education grants are paid to mothers if their school age children attend school regularly. Interestingly such condiitonal cash transfers have become quite popular. In 1998 the British government has piloted a similar program targetted to children aged 16-18 (see Dearden et al 2005) . The program has received considerable attention and publicity. More recently programs similar to and insipired by PROGRESA were imlemented in Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, Turkey and other countries. Rawlings (2004) contains a survey of some of these programs.
Skoufias (2001) provides additional details on PROGRESA and its evaluation.
PROGRESA is first targeted at the locality level. In 1997, a number of poor communities in rural Mexico were declared eligible for the program. Roughly speaking, the two criteria communities had to satisfy to qualify for the program were a certain degree of poverty (as measured by what is called an 'index of marginalization', basically the first principal component of a certain number of village level variables routinely collected by the government) and access to certain basic structures (schools and health centers). The reason for the second criterion is the conditional nature of the program: without some basic structures within a certain distance, beneficiary households could not comply with the conditions for retaining the beneficiary status (participation in vaccination and check-up visits for the health and nutrition components and school attendance for the education component). As a consequence of these eligibility criteria the PROGRESA communities, while poor, are not the poorest in Mexico.
Within each community, then the program is targeted by proxy means testing. Once a locality qualifies, individual households could qualify or not for the program, depending on a single indicator, once again the first principal component of a number of variables (such as income, house type, presence of running water, and so on). Eligibility was determined in two steps. First, a general census of the Progresa localities measured the variables needed to compute the indicator and each household was defined as 'poor' or 'not-poor' (where 'poor' is equivalent to eligibility). Subsequently, in March 1998, an additional survey was carried out and some households were added to the list of beneficiaries. This second set of beneficiary households are called 'densificados'. Fortunately, the re-classification survey was operated both in treatment and control towns.
The largest component of the program is the education one. Beneficiary households with school age children receive grants conditional on school attendance. The size of the grant increases with the grade and, for secondary education, is slightly higher for girls than for boys. In Table 1 , we report the grant structure. All the figures are in current pesos, and can be converted in US dollars at approximately an exchange rate of 10 pesos per dollar. In addition to the (bi) monthly payments, beneficiaries with children in school age receive a small annual grant for school supplies.
For logistic and budgetary reasons, the program was phased in slowly but is currently very large. In 1998 it was started in less than 10,000 localities. However, at the end of 1999 it was implemented in more than 50,000 localities and had a budget of about US$777m or 0.2% of Mexican GDP. At that time, about 2.6 million households, or 40% of all rural families and one ninth of all households in Mexico, were included in the program. The program represents a substantial help for the beneficiaries. The nutritional component of 100 pesos per month (or 10 US dollars) in the second semester of 1998, corresponded to 8% of the beneficiaries' income in the evaluation sample. Type of benefit  1998 1st sem. 1998 2nd sem. 1999 1st sem. 1999 2nd sem  Nutrition support  190  200  230  250  Primary school  3  130  140  150  160  4  150  160  180  190  5  190  200  230  250  6  260  270  300  330  secondary 
PROGRESA bi-monthly monetary benefits

The evaluation sample
Before starting the program, the agency running it decided to start the collection of a large data set to evaluate its effectiveness. Among the beneficiaries localities, 506
where chosen randomly and included in the evaluation sample. In what follows we make an extensive use of both the household and the locality survey.
In particular, we use the household questionnaire to get information on each child's age, completed last grade, school enrolment, parental background, state of residence, school costs. We use the locality questionnaire to get information on distance from schools and prevailing wages.
3 Measuring the impact of the program by comparing treatment and control villages.
In this section, we discuss the evidence that can be obtained by comparing treatment and control villages. The main purpose of this exercise is to show how the random allocation of the program between treatment and control localities can be used to evaluate the effect of the program. However, such an exercise would estimate the impact of the program as a whole, without specifying the mechanisms through which it operates. Schultz (2003) presents a complete set of evaluation results, which are substantially similar to those presented here. Here our focus is on introducing some aspects of the data that are pertinent to our model and to the sample we use to estimate it. And more importantly, by describing the effect of the program in this sample we use to estimate our structural model, we set the mark against which it will be fitted.
If the allocation of the program across localities is truly random and treatment and control villages are statistically identical, comparing them provides a reliable and simple estimate of the program's impact. The quality of the randomization can be evaluated by testing for the presence of significant difference in measured variables in the baseline surveys in treatment and control villages. An extensive study of this type has been performed by Behrman and Todd (1999) . They find that, for the large majority of a very wide set of variables, there are no statistical differences between treatment and control villages.
Given the results in Behrman and Todd (1999) , we proceed to evaluate the difference in enrollment rates between treatment and control variables for eligible and ineligible children. As our structural model will be estimated on boys, we report only the results for them. The effects for girls are slightly higher but not substantially different from those reported here for boys. As we will be interested in how the effect of the grant is affected by age, we also report the results for different age groups. In particular, we consider boys less than 10, boys aged 10 to 13 and older than 13. Finally we need to take into account two possible definitions of 'eligibility'. While, in principle, children belonging to households that were re-defined as eligible in 1998, just before the start of the program, should all have got the program (conditional on school attendance), it turns out that a substantial fraction of them, probably for administrative errors, did not. In Table 2 ,
where we report our results, therefore, we have three columns. The first refers to the difference in school enrolments for children who were defined as eligible in 1997. Most of these children did get the program conditional on attendance. In the second column, we add the children who were classified as eligible in 1998. As mentioned above, a substantial fraction of the 'reclassified' children did not receive the program. The estimates in this
column should measure what in the evaluation literature is sometimes referred to as the intention to treat . In the third column we report the difference in enrolment rates for ineligible children.
The average treatment effect is of 0.039 points on the children belonging to the original eligible households. The effect is concentrated among the oldest children, being not significantly different from zero for the youngest group and almost 9% for the oldest.
These effects are slightly smaller when we consider the intent to treat estimates on the group that includes the new eligible households, some of which, did not get the program.
The results in the third column are the most surprising, as they would indicate a substantive effect of the program on the enrollment of ineligible children. There are two possible alternative explanations of such a result. First, it is possible that the effect is genuine and reflects spill-overs from eligible families to non eligible ones. The alternative explanation, instead, would point out to pre-program differences between treatment and control villages. Given the evidence in Behrman and Todd (1999) , the latter explanation is surprising. However, the size of the effect seems to be too large to be plausible: for older children (aged 14-17) the effect on ineligible children would be actually larger than for the eligible ones.
To investigate the matter further, we turn to the analysis of pre-program differences.
In Table 3 we re-do the exercise presented in Table 2 but on the baseline data collected in August 1997, before the program started operating. From this table, it emerges that the pre-program differences between attendance rates of eligible children in treatment and control communities are very small indeed and never statistically different from zero.
Instead, especially for older children, we observe sizeable differences in pre-program enrollment rates for non-eligible children. While the estimates are not extremely precise, and an explanation of these differences is not obvious, it is important, in evaluating the effect of the program, to take this difference into account.
Having used the baseline to verify the existence of pre-program differences in enrollment rates, we can also use it to control for them. In particular, to estimate the effect of the program, we can use a difference in difference estimator. Such an approach, however, requires assumptions not usually necessary in a randomized experiment: that is that trends between treatment and control groups are the same. We report the estimates of the effect of the program that take into account the differences observed in Table 3 in Table 4 .
The results in Table 4 indicate that the program has, on average, an effect of about 3% on school enrollment of boys aged 6 to 17. There are, however, some large differences in the effect of the program by age. The effect is much larger (around 7.5%) for older boys and virtually zero for boys younger than 9. Finally, on ineligible boys we find no significant effect of the program. Only for the older group the point estimate indicates a somewhat positive effect, but not as large as the one obtained by simple differences.
Unfortunately, for this group, which is much smaller than that of the beneficiaries, the estimates are not extremely precise.
What do we learn from this exercise that is relevant for our structural approach?
First and foremost, it is clear that there were some pre-program differences between treatment and control villages which should be taken into account. These differences make a difference for the size of the estimated program's impact and, although we do not have a convincing explanation for them, they will have somehow enter in our structural model.
It is somewhat comforting that the pre-program differences are concentrated among the ineligible families. A simple strategy, therefore, would be to restrict our estimation sample to the eligible households. We come back to these issues when we discuss the identification of our model. Second, the effect of the program is different for different age groups. As we will see, our model will assume that the program works by changing the relative price of schooling relative to working. While we consider a reasonably flexible specification, it is not completely obvious that the model should reproduce the pattern of different age effects we see in the data, as we estimate a unique coefficient for the grant. The pattern of results that emerges from Table 4 therefore, constitutes a useful benchmark against which to evaluate the goodness of fit of our model.
The model
We use a simple dynamic school participation model. Each child, (or his/her parents) decide whether to attend school or to work taking into account the economic incentives involved with such choices. Parents are assumed here to act in the best interest of the child and consequently we do not admit any interactions between children. We assume that children have the possibility of going to school up to age 17. All formal schooling ends by that time. In the data, almost no individuals above age 17 are in school. We assume that children who go to school do not work and vice-versa. We also assume that children necessarily choose one of these two options. If they decide to work they receive a village/education/age specific wage. If they go to school, they incur a (utility) cost (which might depend on various observable and unobservable characteristics) and, with a certain probability, progress a grade. At 18, everybody ends formal schooling and reaps the value of schooling investments in the form of a terminal value function that depends on the highest grade passed. The PROGRESA grant is easily introduced as an additional monetary reward to schooling, that would be compared to that of working.
The model we consider is dynamic for two main reasons. First, the fact that one cannot attend regular school past age 17 means that going to school now provides the option of completing some grades in the future: that is a six year old child who wants 13 to complete secondary education has to go to school (and pass the grade) every single year, starting from the current. This source of dynamics becomes particularly important when we consider the impact of the PROGRESA grants, since children,as we saw above, are only eligible for six grades: the last three years of primary school and the first three of secondary. Going through primary school (by age 14), therefore, also 'buys' eligibility for the secondary school grants. Second, we allow for state dependence: The number of years of schooling affects the utility of attending in this period. We explicitly address the initial conditions problem that arises from such a consideration and discuss the related identification issues at length below. State dependence is important because it may be a mechanism that reinforces the effect of the grant.
Instantaneous utilities from schooling and work
In each period, going to school involves instantaneous pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs, in addition to losing the opportunity of working for a wage. The current benefits come from the utility of attending school and possibly, as far as the parents are concerned, by the childcare services that the school provides during the working day. As mentioned above, the benefits are also assumed to be a function of past attendance. The costs of attending school are the costs of buying books etc. as well as clothing items such as shoes.
There are also transport costs to the extent that the village does not have a secondary school. For households who are entitled to Progresa and live in a treatment village, going to school involves receiving the grade and gender specific grant.
As we are using a single cross section, we use the notation t to signify the age of the child in the year of the survey. Variables with a subscript t may be varying with age. Denote the utility of attending school for individual i in period t who has already attended ed it years as u s it .We posit:
where z it relates to a number of taste shifter variables, including parental background, age and state dummies. The variable 1(p it = 1) denotes attendance in primary school, while the variable 1(s it = 1) denotes attendance in secondary school. x p it and x s it represent factors affecting the costs of attending primary school and secondary school respectively.
The term ε it represents a logistic error term which is assumed independently and identically distributed over time and individuals Notice that the presence of ed it introduces an important element of dynamics we alluded to above: schooling choices affect future grades and, therefore, the utility cost of schooling. Finally, the term µ i represents unobservables which we assume have a constant impact over time. As we discuss below, we will be assuming that µ i is a discrete random variable whose points of support and probability distribution we estimate.
The utility of not attending school is denoted by
where w it are (potential) earnings when out of school. The wage is a function (estimated from data) of age and education attainment as well as village of residence that we discuss below.
Uncertainty
There are two sources of uncertainty in our model. The first is an iid shock to schooling costs, modelled by the (logistic) random term ε it . Given the structure of the model, having a logistic error in the cost of going to school is equivalent to having two extreme value errors, one in the cost of going to school and one in the utility of work. Although the individual knows ε it in the current period, 1 she does not know its value in the future.
Since future costs will affect future schooling choices, indirectly they affect current choices.
Notice that the term µ i , while known (and constant) for the individual, is unobserved by the econometrician.
The second source of uncertainty originates from the fact that the pupil may not be 1 We could have introduced an additional residual term ε w it in equation 2. As what matterns for the fit of the model is only the difference between the current (and future) utility of schooling and working, assuming that both ε it and ε w it were distributed as an extreme value distribution is equivalent to assuming a single logistic residual. successful in completing the grade. If a grade is not completed successfully, we assume that the level of education does not increase. We assume that the probability of failing to complete a grade is exogenous and does not depend on effort or on the willingness to continue schooling. We allow however this probability to vary with the grade in question and with the age of the individual and we assume it known to the individual. 2 We estimate the probability of failure for each grade as the ratio of individuals who are in the same grade as the year before at a particular age. Since we know the completed grade for those not attending school we include these in the calculation -this may be important since failure may discourage school attendance. In the appendix we provide a Table with our estimated probabilities of passing a grade.
The return to education and the terminal value function
As mentioned above, after age 17, we assume individuals work and earn wages depending on their level of education. In principle, one could try to measure the returns to education investment from the data on the wages received by adults in the village with different level of educations. However, the number of choices open to the individual after school include working in the village, migrating to the closest town or even migrating to another state.
Since we do not have data that would allow us to model these choices (and schooling as a function of these) we model the terminal value function in the following fashion:
where ed i,18 is the education level achieved by age 18. The parameters α 1 and α 2 of this function will be estimated alongside the other parameters of the model and will be constrained to be non-negative. 3 To check whether our estimate make sense we compare the implied returns to education with observed wage differentials in Mexico.
2 Since we estimate this probability from the data we could also allow for dependence on other characteristics.
3 We have used some information on urban and rural returns to education at the state level along with some information on migration in each state to try to model such a relationship. Unfortunately, we have no information on migration patterns and the data on the returns to education are very noisy. This situation has motivated our choice of estimating the returns to education that best fit our education choices.
Value functions
Since the problem is not separable overtime, schooling choices involve comparing the costs of schooling now to its future and current benefits. The latter are intangible preferences for attending school including the potential child care benefits that parents may enjoy.
We denote by I ∈ {0, 1} the random increment to the grade which results from attending school at present. If successful, then I = 1, otherwise I = 0. We denote the probability of success at age t for grade ed as p s t (ed it ).
Thus the value of attending school for someone who has completed successfully ed i years in school and is of age t already and has characteristics z it is
where the expectation is taken over the possible outcomes of the random shock ε it . The value of working is similarly written as
The difference between the first terms of the two equations reflects the current costs of attending, while the difference between the second two terms reflects the future benefits and costs of schooling. The parameter β represents the discount factor. In practice, since we do not model savings and borrowing explicitly this will reflect liquidity constraints or other factors that lead the households to disregard more or less the future.
Given the terminal value function described above, these equations can be used to compute the value of school and work for each child in the sample recursively. These formulae will be used to build the likelihood function used to estimate the parameters of this model.
Allowing for the programme
The Progresa grant is easily introduced in our model. Since the grant is payable only when children attend school (and therefore, according to our assumptions, do not work)
it acts as a "negative" wage. However we do not wish to impose the restriction that the grant and the weekly wage have the same impact. We thus modify the utility from schooling to be
where δ is the coefficient on the wage in 2 . Therefore, the coefficient γ measures the impact of the grant as a proportion of the impact of the wage. We estimate this model on individuals drawn from a combined sample of villages receiving the programme (treatment) and the set of randomly excluded villages. The treatment sample also includes ineligible individuals. For these individuals, and for those living in the control localities, the grant is uniformly zero. For the other individuals, it will depend on their schooling decisions and on the grade they are currently attending. The grant (which is a function of the school grade currently attended -as in Table 1 ) is suitably scaled so to be comparable to the wage. If γ = 1, the effect of the grant on utility and therefore on schooling choices, would be the same as that of the wage. In some standard economic model they should have the same effect. If this was the case, the effect of the program could be estimated even using data only from the control communities in which it does not operate, from estimates of δ. This is the strategy used by Todd and Wolpin (2003) . The design of the experiment allows us to address this important issue.
Our sample includes both eligible and ineligible individuals. Eligibility is determined on the basis of a number of observable variables that might affect schooling costs and utility. To take into account the possibility of these systematic differences, we also include in equation 3 a dummy for eligibility (which obviously is operative both in treatment and control localities).
As we discussed in Section 3, there seems to be some differences in pre-program enrolment rates between treatment and control localities. As we do not have an obvious explanations for these differences, we use two alternative strategies. First we control for them by adding to the equation for the schooling utility (3) a dummy for treatment villages. Obviously such a dummy will absorb some of the exogenous variability induced by the experiment. We discuss this issue when we tackle the identification question in the next section. A less extreme approach, justified by the fact that most of the unexplained differences in pre-program enrollment is observed among non-eligible household, we introduce a dummy for this group.
Finally, using a structural model allows us to address the issue of anticipation effects and the assumptions required for their identification. PROGRESA as well as other randomized experiments or pilot studies create a control group by delaying the implementation of the program in some areas, rather than excluding them completely. In this case it is possible that the control villages react to the program prior to its implementation, depending on the degree to which they believe they will eventually receive it. A straight comparison between treatment and control areas may then underestimate the impact of the program. A structural model that exploits other sources of variation, such as the variation of the grant with age may be able to estimate the extent of anticipation effects.
We investigate this with our model by examining the fit of the model under different assumptions about when the controls are expecting to receive payment. As it turns out we find no anticipation effects here.
Wages
Our model includes wages as an opportunity cost of schooling. Child wages are only observed for those working and moreover they are likely to be measured with error. To address these issues we estimate a wage equation for individual i in village j and obtain ln w ij = −0.58 
Habits and Initial Conditions
The presence of ed it in equation 1 creates an important initial conditions problem because we do not observe the entire history of schooling for the children in the sample as we use a single cross section. We cannot assume that the random variable µ i is independent of past school decisions as reflected in the current level of schooling ed it .
To solve this problem we specify a reduced form for educational attainment up to the current date. We model the level of schooling by an ordered probit with index function h 0 i ζ + ξµ i where we have assumed that the same heterogeneity term µ i enters the prior decision multiplied by a loading factor ξ i . The vector h i includes variables reflecting past schooling costs such as the distance from the closest secondary schools in pre-experimental years. Since school availability, as measured by variables such as distance, changes over time, it can be used as an instrument in the initial conditions model that is excluded from the subsequent (current) attendance choice, which depends on the school availability during the experiment. Hence we can write the probability of ed it = e and of child i attending school as
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This will be the key component of the likelihood function presented below. The endogeneity of the number of passed grades (the stock of schooling) is therefore captured by the common heterogeneity factor µ i affecting both decisions The loading factor ξ governs the covariance between the two equations. It is important to stress the role played in identification by the variables that capture lagged availability of schools as variables that enter the initial condition equations but not the current participation equation.
Identification and Estimation
Identification
In the context of our model, there are two identification issues. The first concerns the identification of the model in the presence of habits and unobserved heterogeneity. In the previous section we stressed that identification can as far as this aspect is concerned, be achieved because of the presence of lagged school availability variables in the initial condition equation.
The second issues is about the identification of the effect of the program and the sources of variation in the data that allow us to measure such a parameter. We already mentioned that a version of the model in which the effect of the grant can be identified from the control sample alone without using the program data at all: If we assume that the effect of the grant is the same (but opposite in sign) as the effect of the wage, we can exploit variation across villages in children wages to estimate this parameter.
Here, however, we are interested in estimating a version of the model that allows these two parameters to be different. We therefore need variation in the grant received by individuals in our sample.
The grant available (or not) to the children in our sample varies for several reasons.
First, some individuals live in treatment villages, while others live in control villages. This variation, given the random assignment of the program, is, by construction, exogenous and can be used to identify the parameter of interest. However, as we discussed in Section 3, there seem to be some differences in pre-program school enrollment between treatment and control villages, especially among ineligible families. We therefore might want to allow for such (unexplained) differences in pre-programme enrollment between treatment and control via a 'treatment' dummy. Such a strategy sacrifices some of the variability induced by the experiment to measure the effect of the program, although the effect of the grant is still identified, in principle, by the fact that it varies with grade as well as by the comparison between eligible and ineligible individuals. However we do not wish to rely on this latter source of variation and clearly we want to put more weight on the exogenous experimental variation. We thus introduce a dummy variable for eligibility (whether in a treatment or control village). We then also note that the main source of pre-program differences are due to differences in the enrolment of the ineligibles across treatment and control villages. We therefore remove the treatment dummy an replace it with a dummy for an ineligible household living in a treatment village. In this version of the model the effect of the grant is identified by the comparison between eligible households in treatment and control villages and by the age variation of the grant, over and above the linear age effect we allow to affect preferences. Thus to summarize we present results of three specifications: In the first we only include a dummy for eligibility (only i.e. whether the household is poor or not); in the second we add a dummy for living in a treatment village; in the third we remove the treatment dummy and add a dummy for treatment village interacted with being ineligible (poor).
The discount factor in this model as well as reflecting individual time preference also summarizes the impact of liquidity constraints, to the extent that these are important.
Thus a low discount factor may be a reflection of an inability of households to transfer funds between periods. This would limit their behavioral response to promises of future grants. However, since the model relates to a discrete binary choice, the actual value of the discount factor is not identified -rather just the ratio of the discount factor to the standard deviation of the error is identified. This ratio, which we keep refering to as the discount factor in what follows, is identified by the variation induced in future opportunities by the age at which the policy is introduced. It need not be lower than 1 but it has to be positive. In our case it turns out to be below 1.
We conclude this discussion stressing that, while functional form assumptions play a role as in all structural models, the experimental information is key to both the estimation of the model and the validation of the results. Without such variation we would need to rely exclusively on wage variation and we would not have this explicitly exogenous source of variation for the costs of schooling.
Estimation
We estimate the model by a combination of maximum likelihood and a grid search for the discount factor.
Denote by F (·) the distribution of the iid preference shock ε it , assumed logistic. Assume the distribution of unobservables µ i is independent of all observables in the population and approximate it by a discrete distribution with M points of support s m each with probability p m , all of which need to be estimated (Heckman and Singer, 1984) . The joint probability of attendance and having already achieved e years of education (ed it = e) can then be written as
The probability of attending school conditional on µ i and ed it = e is given by the F (·); the expectations inside the probability are taken over future uncertain realizations of the shock ε it and the success of passing a grade; the sum is taken over all points of support of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. The expressions for the value functions at subsequent ages are computed recursively starting from age 18 and working backwards until the current age using the formulae in Section 4.4. The logistic assumption on the ε it allows us to derive a closed form expression for the terms in equation 6 23 The log-likelihood function is then based on this probability and takes the form
where D i = 1 denotes a school attendee in the sample of N children. To estimate the parameters we combine maximum likelihood and a grid search for the discount factor.
Thus we maximize 7 with respect to all unknown parameters fixing the discount factor β to many different values in increments of 0.05.
Estimation results
In this section, we report the results we obtain estimating different versions of the dynamic programming model we discussed earlier. We start by presenting estimates of the basic model and then discuss extensions and robustness checks we have performed.
In Tables 5 to 7 , we present estimates of the three versions of the basic mode we mentioned above: the first column of each table refers to the version that ignores preprogram school enrollment between treatment and control villages, in the second column such differences are accounted for by a 'treatment dummy', while in the third they are accounted for by a dummy for non-eligible treatment households. We estimate all the versions of the model on the sample of boys older than 9. All specifications include, both in the initial condition equation and in the cost of education equation, state dummies, whose estimates are not reported for the sake or brevity. In addition, we have variables reflecting parental education (the excluded groups are heads and spouses with less than completed primary) and parents ethnicity. We also include the distance from the secondary school as well as the cost of attending such school, which in some cases includes fees. Finally all specifications include a dummy for eligibility (potential if in a control village-poor).
While we do not estimate the discount factor along with the other parameters of the model, we carried out a coarse grid search in steps of 0.05 and we have found that the value of 0.85 maximizes the likelihood. 4 All our results are conditional on such a value
As mentioned above, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity that is modelled as a discrete variable with three points of support. The same variable enters, with different loading factors, both the utility of going to school equation and the initial condition equations. Such a variable, therefore, plays an important role in that it allows for a flexible specification of unobserved heterogeneity and determines the degree of correlation between the utility of schooling and completed schooling, which, by entering the equation for the current utility of schooling, introduces an important dynamic effect into the model. We therefore start reporting, in Table 5 , the estimates of the points of support of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, and that of the loading factor of the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the initial condition equation. Three points of support seemed to be enough to capture the observed heterogeneity in our sample. Effectively we have three types of children, of which one is very unlikely to go to school and accounts for roughly 10% of the sample. Given that attendance rates at young ages are close to 90%, it is likely that these are the children that have not been attending primary school and, for some reason, would be very difficult to attract to school. Another group, which accounts for about 30% of the sample is much more likely to be in school. The largest group, accounting for 60% of the sample, is the middle one.
The loading factor of the unobserved heterogeneity term is positive (as expected) but not extremely precisely estimated. This is one of the few parameters whose size depends crucially on the value of the discount factor. Imposing, for instance, a discount factor of 0.9 (which leads to a marginal reduction of the likelihood function) would increase considerably the size of this parameter and make it significantly different from zero.
The initial condition ed it is modeled as an ordered probit with age specific cutoff points. The cutoff points are age specific to reflect the fact that different ages will have very different probabilities to have completed a certain grade. Indeed, even the number of cutoff points is age specific, to reflect the fact that relatively young children could not have completed more than a certain grade. 5 In addition to the variables considered in the specification for school utility, we include among the regressors the presence of a secondary school and the distance from the nearest secondary school in 1997. It is important to stress that these variables are included in the initial condition model only, in addition to the availability and distance of secondary school in 1998 that enters both equations. As discussed above, they effectively identify the dynamic effect of schooling on preferences. It is therefore comforting that they are strongly significant: both the dummy for the presence of a secondary and a primary school in 1997 have a t-value above 5 even when (as in the We now turn to the variables included in the education choice model, reported in the top panel of Table 7 . All the variables, except for the grant and the wage are expressed as determinants of the cost of schooling, so that a positive sign on a given variable, decreases the probability of currently attending school. The wage is expressed as a determinant of the utility of work (so that an increase in wages decreases school attendance) and the grant is a determinant of the utility of schooling, so that an increase in it, increases school attendance. In addition, the coefficient on the grant is expressed as ratio to the coefficient on the wage, so that a coefficient of 1 indicates that a unitary increase in the grant has the same effect on the utility of school than an increase in the wage has on the utility of work.
In terms of background characteristics, belonging to a household and with less educated parents leads to lower attendance. This may be a reflection of liquidity constraints or of different costs of schooling. Perhaps surprisingly, the coefficient on poor (eligible) households is not significantly different from zero, while that on indigenous households indicates that, ceteris paribus, they are more likely to send their children to school. The states that exhibit the higher costs are Queretaro and Puebla, followed by San Luis Potosi and Michoacan, while Veracruz and Guerrero are the cheapest. The costs of attending secondary measured in either distance (since many secondary schools are located in neighboring village) or in terms of money have a significant and negative effect on attendance.
Both age and grade have a very important effect on the cost of schooling, age increasing and grade decreasing it. The coefficient on age is the way in which the model fits the decline in enrolment rates by age across both treatment and control villages. The effect on the grade captures the dynamics of the model and, as we discussed, is identified by the presence of lagged supply of school infrastructure. We find a very strong effect of state dependence despite the fact that we include age as one of the explanatory variables.
The pre-existing level of education is a critical determinant of choice, with increased levels of education having a substantially positive effect on further participation. This is of course an important point since it provides an additional mechanism by which the subsidy may increase educational participation. It also implies different effects depending on the amount of prior educational participation.
As we discussed above, we have scant information on the returns to education, so that we include the returns to education among the parameters to be inferred from the differential attendance rates in school. Notes as in Table 5 . Discount rate β = 0.85 State dummies included per year, maybe a bit low in the Mexican context, but above the average return to education observed in our villages.
Cost variables have the expected sign and are significant. For instance, an increase in the distance from the nearest secondary school, significantly decreases the probability of attending school. Likewise for an increase in the average cost of attending secondary school. As several of the children in our sample are still attending primary school we also tried to include variables reflecting the cost and availability of primary schools, but we could not identify any significant effect.
The key parameters of the model from a policy perspective are the wage coefficient and the coefficient of the grant itself. An increase in the wage decreases the probability of attending school. On average, the effect of reducing the wage by 44% (which would roughly give a reduction similar to the average grant to beneficiaries) increases the probability of attending school by 4%. This effect cannot, obviously, be inferred from the value of the parameter alone and is obtained from the simulations of the model that we discuss in detail below.
The value of the grant varies by treatment and control villages (where of course it is zero) and by grade the child could be attending. 6 The way we parameterize the model, the total effect of the grant is equal to the product of the wage and the grant coefficients, meaning that the impact of the grant is about twice that of the wage. Based on a likelihood ratio test one strongly rejects the hypothesis that the grant coefficient is 1.
7
This result is important because it suggests that the effects of the program cannot be predicted using a model with the standard economic incentives incorporated through the wage (see Todd and Wolpin, 2003) .
The three versions of the model we present differ because of the presence, in column 6 As mentioned above, in secundary school, the grant is also higher for girls than for boys. However, as we only estimate the model for the latter, we do not exploit this variation.
7 Since this hypothesis is subject to normalisation the Wald test is not appropriate see Veal( 30 B and C of Table 7 of a dummy for Progresa villages (col B) and one for Progresa non eligible. As we discussed above, these are meant to capture pre-program differences that were identified to be present in enrolment rates despite the random assignment of the programme. In Section 3, we showed that most of the pre-programme differences are explained by differences among non eligible households. This evidence would justify the specification in Column C. The specification in Column B takes a more conservative approach and controls for the fact of living in a Progresa village. This could be too conservative as it absorbs much of the experimental variability of the grant.
Comparing the results across specifications, we see that most coefficients do not change much. Not surprisingly, the only coefficient that exhibits some variation is the one on the grant. And even that does not change much between Column A and C. The size of the coefficient on the grant, however, is somewhat reduced in column B, which, therefore, provides a lower bound on the effect of the programme.
The model is complex and non linear. To quantify the effect of the main variables of interest from a policy point of view, that is to assess how the grant operates and what its effect are we now turn to the analysis of some simulations.
Simulations
We now use the model to simulate school participation under different scenarios. The first exercise is simply aimed at evaluating the effect of the PROGRESA grant as designed.
For such a purpose we compute, for each child in the sample, the probability of enrolment with and without the grant. The effect is then computed averaging the differences between these probabilities. In Figure 1 , the continuous line plots these averages by age for each of the three versions of the model estimated in Table 7 . The effect of the PROGRESA grant is very small at the youngest ages and peaks, for the three figures age 15. Perhaps not surprisingly, the effect is smaller when we introduce a 'treatment dummy' in the model.
The other two models (the one without any 'treatment dummy' -B in the table and the one with a 'treatment-ineligible' dummy -C in the table) yield similar results. Reassuringly, these results are very similar to the diffifference-in-differences results described in Section 3. This indicates that the model fits the data reasonably well: our dynamic model is able to fit with a single parameter (the one on the grant) the pattern of effects by age groups we obtained in Section 3. One of the main advantages of having a structural model, however, is the possibility of performing policy experiments. The first we perform is to compare the effect of the current program with that of a similar program that differs in the way in which the grant varies with the grade attended.
The aim of this exercise is to compare the impact of the current grant, as predicted by our model to that where the structure is changed so as to target the program to those in the most responsive ages. In particular, we focus on a 'balanced budget' reform of the programme. That is, we increase the grant for children above grade 6 and set it to zero for children below that grade. The increase for the older children is calibrated so that, taking into account the response of children schooling choices to the change, the overall cost of the program is left unchanged (at least for our sample).
We plot the result of this exercise in the same Figure 1 where we plotted the average effects of the current grant, as the discontinuous line. The graph shows that the impact on school participation can almost double by targeting the grant to the older children, with no effect on the school participation of the younger primary age children. This is not surprising since the grant hardly changes their behavior in the first place. However, it does show that the older children are sufficiently sensitive to economic incentives for a redesign of the policy to have major effects. Obviously the grant on the younger children has other effects, for example on health and cognitive as well as physical development. Of course, one should note that almost all children go to school below grade 6, which means that the early part of the grant does not really have a conditional nature. In removing the grant form these children we are assuming that the sole purpose of the policy is to induce children into school. If this was considered as a general anti-poverty measure disguised as a schooling subsidy this policy trade-off, whose effect we are simulating may not be households is the same in the two cases. Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider the cost such a policy in terms of future schooling participation by restructuring the grant, offering it to the group where behavioral effects are most important.
We next consider a number of alternative experiments. In particular we consider the effect of the wage on school participation, the effect of distance to school and the impact of unobserved costs. All three experiments are summarized in figure 2 . In all cases we use the model which includes a Progresa dummy for the eligible individuals only.
First we decrease the wage by an amount equivalent to the grant. We see that the effect of the wage is estimated to be lower than the grant For example at age 15 the incentive effect is half the one in figure . This is an important point and puts into question the possibility to evaluate programs of this kind using an ex ante evaluation model that relies on observable market data, rather than on experimental/pilot data.
In the next experiment we demonstrate the effects of a potential school building program that would reduce the distance of secondary schools to no more than 3 km. We consider this because it would constitute an alternative policy to subsidizing participation (although we do not claim that this policy is equivalent in terms of cost or in terms of other benefits such as better nutrition and its impact). The effect is quite substantial and increases participation by 6 percentage points at age 15.
Finally in order to demonstrate the potential importance of targeting we show the effects of the policy on individuals with "low cost" of schooling; i.e. we evaluate the effect at the point of support of the unobserved heterogeneity with the highest school participation. As shown in the graph for these individuals there is no effect of the program before age 14. Beyond that the effects are higher than average. Conversely, for the high cost of schooling individuals (not shown) the effects are higher than average at younger ages and lower later.
Conclusions
In this paper we have evaluated the effect of a large welfare program in rural Mexico aimed, among other things, at increasing enrolment rates among poor children. The evaluation survey we use has an important randomization component that induces truly exogenous variation in the enrolment into the program. After presenting some evidence based on simple differences and differences in differences, we show that many questions are left unanswered by this type of techniques and propose the use of a structural model. 
